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Active Transposition
of EU Legislation
By Dr Michael Kaeding Dr Michael Kaeding Dr Michael Kaeding Dr Michael Kaeding Dr Michael Kaeding*
Better regulation cannot be achieved without giving serious attention to transposition. As a
matter of fact EU Member States frequently breach EC law. The existing efforts by the European
Commission to achieve effective transposition across Member States, such as the more frequent
use of impact assessments, pre-legislative consultation processes and a dozen recommendations
for an improved national coordination of transposition processes1 seem to have missed out on
tackling the EU-wide transposition deficit. Also the recently adopted European Commission
Communication, A Europe of Results – Applying Community Law,2 will not do the job and solve
the pan-European problem.
Introduction Introduction Introduction Introduction Introduction
Although full implementation of EU legislation is enshrined
in the treaties and is necessary for meeting the Lisbon goals
by 2010, most Member States do not live up to this
obligation. In 2006 more than 770 notifications were still
pending and coincided with new European Court of Justice
record fines.3 Non-transposition, however, creates
uncertainty and undermines the legitimacy of EU legislation.
It forestalls further European integration involving the free
movement of goods, persons, services and capital.
Furthermore, it jeopardises
market competitiveness,
national growth, and em-
ployment performances in
Europe and beyond. The
question is why some Mem-
ber States fail to comply with
EU law despite the image-
marring effect on posterior EU negotiations and costly
consequences both in pecuniary and legal terms?
This article analyses the timeliness of national
transposition processes across nine Member States (France,
Germany, Greece, Italy, Ireland, the Netherlands, Spain,
Sweden and the UK). Based on extensive quantitative data,4
which covers the full population of all EU transport directives
from 1995 to 2004 including the national implementing
instruments, further insights can be gleaned from controlled
case study research based on interviews with EU officials,
diplomats and civil servants in Member States’ ministries5
and supplementary studies in the burgeoning scholarly
field of compliance, transposition and implementation.6
Based on this rich pool of studies, this study reports that
almost 70% of all national transposition processes are
problematic. Understanding both European-level and
national-level factors is crucial to face this compliance
challenge to ensure prompt transposition of Community
law into national legislation within the prescribed deadlines.
Distinguishing between three outcomes of the transposition
process (on time, short and long delay) it is the specific
features of European directives that account, in particular,
for short term transposition delays; whereas serious times
lags of six months or more are a result of national domestic
factors. To conclude, this article comments on its general
and actor-specific implications.
Transposition deficit across Member States is common Transposition deficit across Member States is common Transposition deficit across Member States is common Transposition deficit across Member States is common Transposition deficit across Member States is common
There has long been a vague supposition that the EU has
a transposition problem.7 At first blush though, the recently
recorded 1.6% deficit8 appears to be getting smaller. At
second sight, this study gives
us a clearer picture and
demonstrates that the EU
does have a serious trans-
position problem across
Member States and different
modes of transport. The EU
transposition deficit is more
than just an illusion; it is sad reality. The EU transposition
problem appears to be rather epidemic and not simply a
“statistical artefact”.9
• 47% of national implementing measures have been
notified late to the European Commission of which 70%
recorded delays of more than six months with a maximum
delay of five years.
The nine Member States under investigation notified only
53% of the national instruments on time. 47% were
transposed late, varying between just a few days tardy to
251 weeks (almost five years) overdue, as is the case for
Greece’s national transposing measure for the EU directive
on the harmonisation of boat masters’ certificates.10 This is
in line with Conant and others11 who even uncover delays
upwards of ten years.
• The time length of missed deadlines varies significantly
across Member States.
Why do some Member
States fail to comply
with EU law?
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The nine Member States can be clustered into three groups
with Sweden (SE) and the UK performing the best, having
an average transposition delay of less than two months. In
Germany (DE), France (FR), Spain (ES) and Ireland (IE)
performance ranges below 30 weeks delay. The Netherlands
(NL), Greece (EL) and Italy (IT) represent a group of their
own, performing worst among the nine Member States with
an average transposition delay exceeding 35 weeks.12
Interestingly, this pattern shifts slightly if we consider the
median value of delay across Member States.
• The time length of missed deadlines varies significantly
across sub-sectors.
However, transposition also varies across the different
transport sub-sectors, namely: maritime, road, rail, air and
inland waterways. Whereas maritime and general transport
directives perform best with an average delay of 20 weeks
or less, Table 2 illustrates that air directives are delayed on
average by one year. Road and rail directives range
between eight and nine months of delay. Inland waterways
directives take the most time. Here, the average transposition
delay is 27 months (2.25 years).13 Again we find slight
changes when looking at the median values. Rail and
inland waterways seem to be the transport sub-sectors with
considerable transposition delays (32-98 weeks) across all
Member States.
• Not only late transposition but also early transposition
is problematic (“gold-plating”), i.e. the temptation to go
beyond the requirements of a Directive when transposing
it into national law.
Following the discussion of “gold plated” EU legislation in
EU Member States, which is embedded in the broader EU
better regulation discourse, the empirics show that it is not
only the commonness of tardy transposition that raises
major concerns about efficient and effective policy-making.
The data uncovers that 20% of the national implementing
measures had been in force more than six months before
the official transposition deadline set in the directive.14 Early
transposition, however, requires national businesses to
adapt to new legislation before their European counter-
parts; an action that may lead to a competitive disadvantage
in the Single Market.15
• Problems in transposition processes occur in 66% of all
national implementing measures.
In sum, almost 70% of all national legal measures
transposing the EU transport acquis in nine Member States
cause problems, either because they are transposed too
late, risking the opening of an infringement proceeding, or
because they are too early, risking warping effects on the
regulatory environment for business and citizens in the EU
alike.
Driving and  Driving and  Driving and  Driving and  Driving and Constraining Forces for Timeliness Constraining Forces for Timeliness Constraining Forces for Timeliness Constraining Forces for Timeliness Constraining Forces for Timeliness
Generally speaking, two main sets of catalysts for policy
change can be identified. Differentiating between policy
design-related (European directive specific), and policy
implementation-related (domestic context specific), each
set has a different impact on the timeliness of national
transposition processes. It seems that serious delays, those
Table 1: National differences in transposition delays in weeks Table 1: National differences in transposition delays in weeks Table 1: National differences in transposition delays in weeks Table 1: National differences in transposition delays in weeks Table 1: National differences in transposition delays in weeks
Delay SE UK DE FR ES IE EL NL IT
(in weeks)
Mean 3 7 25 25 28 29 35 37 42
Median 0 0 8 20 0 10 10 22 13
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longer than six months, are homemade in the capitals of
Member States. On the other hand, the specific features of
European directives, especially their technical aspects,
account for short-term delays: those of six months or fewer.
In this sense, this contribution agrees that “implementation
should be part of design”, suggesting that policy theory is
formulated “with a view toward execution”.16
European directive specific factors explaining short delays European directive specific factors explaining short delays European directive specific factors explaining short delays European directive specific factors explaining short delays European directive specific factors explaining short delays
(< six months) (< six months) (< six months) (< six months) (< six months)
European directive specific factors account for short delays
of national transposition processes.
• The longer a directive’s deadline set for transposition,
the less problematic a swift national transposition.
The more time a Member State has to transpose a directive,
the lower the perceived costs of transposition, and therefore,
the less likely that transposition delay will occur.17
Administrations must always act under time constraints,
regardless of whether administrators like them. The fact
that administrations are obliged to act within a legally fixed
period compels them to improve their coordination and
organisation to respect deadlines. From the equally
important legal point of view, time constraints are even
required by the principle of legal certainty. The transposition
time set in the directive plays a significant role in determining
the timeliness of national transposition processes. It is a
necessary condition for apt transposition.
• Commission directives are easier to transpose than
legislative directives.
Another distinction is between directives made by the
European Commission based on the primary or secondary
EC law (and, in that case, the result of a comitology
procedure), and those resulting from the Council and
Parliament (Art. 251 EC, co-decision procedure).18 The
argument is that Commission directives are easier to
transpose than directives from the Council and Parliament
since they are often focused on politically less controversial
and more technical issues.
• The higher the amount of a directive’s discretion, the
more difficult to settle the national transposition process
on time.
The leeway of interpretation represents a core characteristic
of a directive, which should specify, in the words of Article
249 of the Treaty, “the result to be achieved” but leave “to
the national authorities the choice of form and methods”.
Over the last decade, however, directives have become
more and more detailed, to the point where they could be
viewed as regulations.19 The empirics show that the level of
a Member State’s discretion in transposing an EU directive
is a significant positive indicator for short delays.20
• The more recitals – considerations at the beginning of
the text of the directive – the more difficult to transpose
in a timely manner.
Recitals represent an important element of each adopted
directive. They are meant to state the purpose of the
directive and to describe each of its main provisions.
Formally, recitals are not legally binding, but intend to help
civil servants in Member States to interpret the purpose of
the directive’s provisions. The findings suggest that granting
discretion may involve a trade-off between the quality and
timing of compliance.21 Not seldom, these recitals seem to
be used by the Member States to insert provisions which
they have failed to get into the text in the Council negotiations
and by the Commission to insert normative provisions
which have not attracted agreement. In the meantime, they
have become so specific that experts talk about a “third kind
of lawmaking”.22 The higher the number of recitals, the
more complex the interpretation of the directive’s content
across national capitals, hence, national transposition
processes are more likely to be delayed.23
• The higher the level of agreement (reading stage) for
legislative directives the more likely a delayed national
transposition process.
Since highly political controversy topics are more likely to
reach the third reading and might already reflect potential
problems across national transposition actors later on in
Member States’ capitals, the stage of agreement serves as
a proxy for the level of interinstitutional controversy of a
policy issue. The higher the stage of agreement (first <
second < third reading), the more likely a national
transposition process will be delayed.24
• Amending directives are often easier to transpose than
new directives.
Some directives are the first to regulate a new area in which
no other EC directive was previously issued. In the case of
maritime directives, the Council Directive 98/18/EC of 17
March 1998 on safety rules and standards for passenger
ships is a clear example. The reverse is a modifying
directive, which changes existing legislation. Since there
already exists national regulation, which is adapted to EC
law, modifying directives can be regarded as a follow-up to
already existing EC and therefore national legislation. The
expectation is that modifying directives are easier to
transpose than new directives (or, the likelihood of swift
transposition is higher for modifying directives).25 See table
3 for an overview.
Domestic context specific factors explaining long delays (> Domestic context specific factors explaining long delays (> Domestic context specific factors explaining long delays (> Domestic context specific factors explaining long delays (> Domestic context specific factors explaining long delays (>
six months) six months) six months) six months) six months)
The outcome of national transposition processes depends
on the institutional arena in which domestic decision
Table 2: Different transposition delays of modes in weeks Table 2: Different transposition delays of modes in weeks Table 2: Different transposition delays of modes in weeks Table 2: Different transposition delays of modes in weeks Table 2: Different transposition delays of modes in weeks
Mode of Transport Maritime Road Rail Air Inland
transport general waterways
Mean -17 20 31 38 49 109
Median 0 6 12 32 23 98
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making takes place. The national context of transposition
is predominantly policy-specific rather than country-
specific.26 Although the so-called worlds of compliance is
an interesting way of looking at implementation,27 it does
not capture the full complexity. Transposition performance
differs between sectors across countries; and between
sectors within one single country since variation by policy
area is more pronounced than variation by state.28 It is
these national level explanatory variables that explain long
delays of over six months.29
• The more political priority assigned to the process, the
easier and less time consuming the transposition.
When a directive is attributed with high political priority,
timely transposition is a
natural outcome. Political
priority represents a signifi-
cant, usually necessary,
condition for timeliness
because it denotes a change
in the usual order of things in
the political realm.30 That is,
under special circumstances,
the political priority for transposing a directive is unusually
high, for any number of reasons.         However, sometimes
directives simply do not garner much priority – for electoral,
economic and strategic matters.
• National elections falling at the beginning of the national
transposition procedure decrease the probability of a
problem-free agreement; a general election at the end
of a transposition process accelerates the adoption of
new national legislation.
General elections  may  accelerate or delay national
transposition records, depending on when they occur. If a
general election falls within the last six months of a set
transposition period, it has an accelerating effect, whereas
a general election scheduled within the first six months of
the official transposition period invariably slows down the
national transposition process. The argument is that a
policy that is not adopted before the end of the legislative
terms must be reintroduced, and by this reintroduction,
raises the costs to the extent that transposition becomes
more opportune.31
• A national transposition package increases the
probability of a delayed transposition of the first directive
in the package, whereas, in turn, it accelerates a
settlement of the last directive.
National transposition packages are the result of Member
States deciding to transpose a number of single EU directives
with one national implementing measure. In Germany for
example, the Seeschifffahrtsanpassungsgesetz, on 18
September 1998, transposed eight maritime directives that
had been adopted in the Council of Ministers between
1996 and 1998. So through a transposition package, a
number of EU directives are grouped together for
transposition purposes because they cover similar policy
issues.32
This number of directives however, often has varying
deadlines. The so-called first directive in the package is the
one with the earliest dead-
line, and the so-called last
directive in the package is
the one with the deadline
furthest into the future. Due
to the perceived trans-
position costs of directives
yet to be transposed, the
national package approach
increases the probability of a delayed settlement of the first
directive to be transposed, but accelerates a settlement for
the last directive in the national transposition package to be
transposed.33
• The more transposition actors in the domestic arena
that are involved in transposing a directive, the longer
it takes to transpose a directive.
Assuming that actors have opposing views on some of the
requirements of a directive, more actors create coordination
problems. A deal between two actors is less complex than
a deal with four because the number of possible policy
combinations is much greater. Complexity can delay the
process considerably. The more actors involved, the more
time needed for policy change.34
• The more ongoing transposition processes in a ministry,
the longer the national transposition processes.
The number of simultaneously ongoing transposition
processes in a ministry’s unit provides a meaningful indicator
of the timeliness of national transposition processes.35
There are periods in which only one national implementing
measure is formulated in a ministry’s unit, whereas there
Not only late transposition
but also early transposition
is problematic.
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Table 3: Driving and constraining forces for timely transposition in the EU: European directive specific factors Table 3: Driving and constraining forces for timely transposition in the EU: European directive specific factors Table 3: Driving and constraining forces for timely transposition in the EU: European directive specific factors Table 3: Driving and constraining forces for timely transposition in the EU: European directive specific factors Table 3: Driving and constraining forces for timely transposition in the EU: European directive specific factors
Factor Effect
Policy design related Transposition time constraints Short delays < 6 months
(European directive specific)
Commission vs. legislative directive
Problem of discretion
Number of recitals
Level of interinstitutional agreement
Amending or new directive
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are periods of time where several EU directives have to be
transposed simultaneously, i.e. strategic withholding of
specific national implementing measures might help to
increase the share of the cooperative pie for the other EU
directives discussed next to it.
• The more national implementing measures used for
transposition, the more likely transposition delays.
The preparation of measures requires administrative
capacity, which is limited in national ministries. More
instruments absorb more administrative capacity, causing
considerable transposition delays.36 See table 4 for an
overview.
Implications Implications Implications Implications Implications
Being at a crossroads of varying ways in which EU policies
are implemented, it is the Member States’ and EU institutions’
task, accelerated by the development of the Lisbon strategy,
to find a deliberate variety of methods to comply with their
membership obligations. Scholarly findings show that the
EU is far from having solved the transposition problem. The
EU transposition deficit appears to be epidemic. The
following general and actor-specific implications can be
derived:
General implications General implications General implications General implications General implications
• Not only late transposition but also early transposition is
problematic. All in all, the EU has a transposition
problem, both in terms of delay and over-implementation
(“gold-plating”). Not only late transposition but also
early transposition is different. Early transposition
requires national businesses to adapt to new legislation
before their European counterparts, an action that may
lead to a competitive disadvantage in the single market.
• Delay is not delay – Determinants for transposition
delays differ between those explaining shorter delays
(<  six months) and those explaining longer delays
(>  six months). It is the EU directive specific
characteristics that explain short delays, and national
level explanatory variables that best account for delays
of more than six months.
• Driving and constraining factors for timeliness are legal,
administrative and political. Transposition is more than
just a legal (amending vs. new directive; Commission
vs. legislative directive ...) or administrative process run
by civil servants in public administrations (occurrence of
a national transposition package; number of national
implementing measures ...). Next to legal and
bureaucratic practices and procedures it is politics that
matter (political priority; number of recitals, general
elections ...).
• Addressing the transposition problem requires a focus
on the whole life cycle of a policy – a piecemeal
approach risks being ineffective. Therefore, policy
implementation should be part of design. Policies need
to be formulated with a view toward its execution. In
order to understand, actors must not separate policy
design from implementation. That is, actors have to
consider European directive specific characteristics as
well as national transposition instrument features and
their different impact on the timeliness of national
transposition processes.
Specific implications for EU institutions Specific implications for EU institutions Specific implications for EU institutions Specific implications for EU institutions Specific implications for EU institutions
EU institutions do not have an independent effect on the
timeliness of national transposition processes.
• European Commission: Although transposition deadlines
set in the directive are often an integral part of the
negotiation process, there are no clear rules on how
they should be determined. As a matter of fact, the
average transposition time agreed upon in the Council,
despite an 84% increase in numbers of directives to be
transposed over recent years, has decreased by 24%.37
Since the mid 1980s to the late 1990s, the average
guaranteed transposition time has steadily decreased
from 18 to 13 months. Thus, in periods of high legislative
output, all things being equal, transposition delays
seem inevitable. Therefore, more time could undoubtedly
be spent by the agenda setter in first researching
existing legislation at a national level, so as to identify
similarities of approach, any significant differences,
underlying policy objectives, perceived shortcomings,
market strengths and weaknesses and any consumer
detriment. The Commission may first make an evaluation
of the transposition’s complexity by conducting a tour
d’Europe. Then, based on this specific input, more
“realistic” deadlines could be imposed.
• European Commission and Member States: They may
strike a balance of power to determine suitable levels of
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Table 4: Driving and constraining forces for timely transposition in the EU: Domestic context specific factors Table 4: Driving and constraining forces for timely transposition in the EU: Domestic context specific factors Table 4: Driving and constraining forces for timely transposition in the EU: Domestic context specific factors Table 4: Driving and constraining forces for timely transposition in the EU: Domestic context specific factors Table 4: Driving and constraining forces for timely transposition in the EU: Domestic context specific factors
Factor Effect
Policy implementation related  National transposition package
(Domestic context specific)
Number of transposition actors
Number of ongoing national Long delays > 6 months
transposition processes
Number of national implementing
measures
Political priority
Accelerating and delaying effect
Election timingE
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discretion. Directives are meant to leave a certain
degree of leeway of interpretation to Member States.
While there are good reasons not to believe that
regulations per se would do the job (as suggested by the
recent Commission’s communication), the so-called
Lamfalussy process could be an alternative and better
example for future reform efforts. To recall, endorsed in
March 2001 by the Stockholm European Council, the
Lamfalussy process was designed to improve the quality
and effectiveness of EU financial services legislation by
differentiating between framework legislation (Level 1)
and technical implement-
ing legislation (Level 2). It
also aims to ensure that
practitioners and other
interested parties are
more fully consulted in
the preparation of new
EU legislation (at both
levels). The Committee of
European Securities Reg-
ulators (CESR) was then
created to advise the
Commission at levels 1
and 2. CESR aims to
ensure greater consis-
tency and equivalence in transposition and imple-
mentation of Directives and, more generally,
convergence of regulatory approaches, through issuing
guidelines and common, but non-binding, standards
by comparing and reviewing national regulatory
practices.
• Council of the European Union: The Council’s Secretariat
has an important role to advise the Council working
group parties under the rotating presidency on how to
avoid obvious pitfalls for the latter policy-implementation
stage. Next to the adoption of a transposition deadline
and a degree of flexibility, the use of recitals should not
be abused as a “third kind of lawmaking”. Adding
issues that were not agreed upon during the negotiations
interferes with a swift national transposition and,
therefore, should be limited if not totally avoided. Ex-
post supplements further increase the directive’s detail
and complexity which will create problems in the domestic
arena. Clear rules about how to apply recitals are due,
including a concluding discussion on their legal status,
which, for the time being, has attracted only scant
attention.
• European Parliament: Legislative directives tend to face
more problems when transposed on the national level
than on the Commission’s directive. Considering the
European Parliament’s growing role under co-decision,
one wonders whether the 2006 reform of the comitology
process38 will have a significant effect on the timeliness
of national instruments transposing Commission
directives (adopted under comitology). The comitology
reform has put the two co-legislators, the EP and the
Council, almost on equal footing (at least in a certain
category of delegated legislation). The Treaty of Lisbon
(if ratified) will even guarantee full blocking rights for the
European Parliament. The first examples under the new
procedure will have to show how the European Parliament
and the interplay between its committees and the
plenary will have adapted. Much here will depend on
the European Parliament’s activism and use of the new
regulatory procedure with scrutiny and the role of
individual MEPs and interest groups in particular.
Specific implications for domestic actors in Member States Specific implications for domestic actors in Member States Specific implications for domestic actors in Member States Specific implications for domestic actors in Member States Specific implications for domestic actors in Member States
• Political priority: It is a significantly necessary, but not
sufficient condition for timeliness by changing the usual
order of things in the political realm.
• Selection of national instrument(s): Early choices about
the selection of a national instrument and the number
of legal instruments have a considerable influence on
the later transposition progress. Depending on the type
of legal instrument chosen
to transpose a directive, the
numbers of ministries in-
volved differ, as does the
requirement for the par-
liament’s approval. In some
countries, parliament may
even be hesitant to coop-
erate with a legislative act if
not consulted at an early
stage. Since there is con-
siderable variation in the
set of legal instruments,39
including fast-track instru-
ments, the timeliness of
national transposition processes can be affected
accordingly.
• Use of national transposition package(s): Depending
on the number of EU directives included in a national
transposition package, and the parameters of their
different deadlines, national transposition packages
have either a significant delaying effect, or a significant
accelerating affect. Consequently, national transposition
packages appear counterproductive and distort the
regulatory framework in which businesses operate if the
number of directives included in a national transposition
package is applied arbitrarily.
Concluding remarks Concluding remarks Concluding remarks Concluding remarks Concluding remarks
In order to face the challenges of an ever globalised world,
it is time to proceed full steam ahead and actively respond
to the challenges of EU law instead of getting lost in
translation. After recent rounds of enlargement, adapting
to EU law will remain an EU-wide ambition on the level of
the statute books, but also in the new Member States where
EU legislation transposition remains dead letters instead of
becoming living rights.40 Although new Member States
perform very well – predominantly leading the latest
European Commission’s scoreboards – the question of
correctness and enforcement has become a major concern.
If Brussels wants to address the Internal Market
constraining effects of Member States’ non-compliance
records, its efforts to simplify and improve the regulatory
environment hence have to go beyond recent efforts. Far-
reaching decisions made in the European Commission’s
drafting and the EU policy-making phase under the
leadership of the Council and the European Parliament
have the greatest effect on the European regulatory
framework in which businesses operate and where the free
movement of goods, persons, services, and capital is at
stake.
Therefore, implementation has to be part of the design,
i.e. next to national related, European legislation related
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features also have considerable influence on the outcome
of the subsequent national implementation process – an
element that has attracted only scant attention. Bearing in
mind that not only delayed but also early transposition is
current praxis in Member States, distinguishing between
different transposition outcomes is helpful. It is the specific
features of a European directive that account for short term
delays, whereas serious time lags are the results of domestic
factors.
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